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CONVENTION REFUGEEHOOD, EARLY
WARNING SIGNS, AND THE STRUCTURAL
CRISIS OF LEGITIMATE STATEHOOD
IN CONTEMPORARY NIGERIA
Obiora Chinedu Okafor*
The struggle for control of Nigeria is an old continuing bat-
tle which is not likely to end as long as the perception re-
mains that the country has been wrongly structured to offer
unique advantages to a particular region.t
I. IxrnooucrroN
That the international refugee protection system, and the set of legal
nonns that underpin it, currently face an extremely serious challenge to
their effectiveness (stemming mostly from the attitudes and actions of the
more powerful refugee-receiving countries of the world), is now widely ac-
knowledged in the extant literature.2 One very important explanation for
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editorial2ienS I 8302.htrnl (last visited April I 3, 200 1 ).2 See G.S. GooowrN-GtLL, Asvt u*a 103-107 (Sopjie Jeleff, ed., Council of Eu-
rope Publishing 1995). See alsa G.S. Goonww-Gr-1, RBrucse N INTeRNnTToNAL
Lew 215,229 (Clwendon Press 1983). J. C. Hathaway, The Meaning of Repatria-
tion, 9 IJRL 551, 553 (1997) ("The economies of industralised states no longer
require substantial and indiscriminate infusions of labour. Nor is there ideological
the growing tendency of many of these states to speak and act in ways that
are subversive of international refugee law is the aversion of these states to
the on-going explosion the world over in the numbers of persons requiring
refugee protection over relatively long periods of time.3 The Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that in 2001,
there were at least twenty-one million convention refugeesa and persons in
similar situations around the world.5 Without conceding the "right" of these
states to rely on the gravity of this situation in order to cut back on their
refugee protection obligations, it follows logically that an important part of
the effort to preserve and enhance international refugee law must be a seri-
ous attempt to reduce significantly the numbers of those in need of refugee
protection at any one time. But, as most refugee scholars now realise, such
a dramatic reduction in the number of the world's asylum-seekers can
or strategic value in the admissions of most refugees. The demise of the post-War
interest convergence between many states and refugees has generated a combina-
tion of non-entrde' tactics and confinement of refugees in their own countries.").
See also B.S. Cnurau, Globalisation, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee
Protection 3 (Refugee Studies Centre 2000) ("The ideology of humanitarianism is,
among other things, facilitating the erosion of the fundamental principles of refugee
protection [as refugees no longer possess ideological or geopolitical valueJ.").
s As James Hathaway has demonstrated, throughout the history of international
refugee protection, the tendency has been for states to attempt to reduce the num-
bers of asylum-seekers they admit precisely at the moments that larger than normal
outflows of asylum-seekers have occurred-the moments of increases need. See
Jnuns C. HnrHnw av, The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920-
1950, 33 Ivr'r & Coup. L. Q. 348, 348 (1984) ("This freedom of intemational
movement accorded to persons broadly defined as refugees came to abrupt halt
after the First World War. The existence of massive groups of refugees who had
been dislocated during the war coincided with the rise of political and economic
nationalism throughout the Western world. Governments responded to this new
social situation by adopting more guarded approaches to immigration in general
and refugee movements in particular."). See also id. at379.
a This term refers to those refugees that meet the relatively narrower test for
"refugeehood" stated in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. See Refu-
gees by Numbers ar http:www.unhcr.ch (last visited January 24,2m2) [hereinafter
Refugees by Numberl. See also http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=
basics ([ast visited January 24, 2002). See also, B. Donlcon, A Half-Century of
Intemational Refugee Protection: Who's Responsible, What's Ahead?, 18 BenKE-
r.By J. Ix'r'r L. 260,263 (2000); Jeremy Levitt, Conflict Prevention, Management,
and Resolution: Africa-Regional Strategies for the Prevention of Displacement and
Protection of Displaced Persons: The Cases of the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, and
IGAD, 11 Duxe J. Corrap. & Ixr'r L. 39, 42'43 (2001).
s See Refugees by Number, supra note 4'
neither be achieved nor sustained without a much more serious attempt to
understand and tackle the root causes of large-scale refugee flows-espe-
cially those root causes that have yet to receive as much attention as they
deserve.
One such relatively neglected root cause of large-scale refugee
flows is the structural crisis of legitimate statehood-a fundamental state-
building crisis-that currently afflicts most post-colonial African states.6
This neglect is highly significant since approximately thirty percent of the
total number of refugees in the world originate from these African states.T
Despite the widespread recognition in the extant literature of the need for a
"root causes approach" to refugee studies,8 the conventional tendency in
that body of literature has been to focus more or less on the ways in which
poor governance, human rights violations, civil and inter-state conflicts,
poverty, development, and ecological problems in African and other states,
have worked to produce mass outflows of refugees.e However, this is not to
say that exceptions to this conventional approach do not exist. At least four
6 For an in-depth examination of this crisis of legitimate statehood in the African
context, see, O.C. OxAron, Re-DeHNNc Lecruprere SrersHooD: Itwenue-
TT9NAL Lnw eNo Srere FRectrnrq'reroN w Arnrce,59-67 (Martinus Nijhoff, ed.,
The Hague 2000) lhereinafter Re-Defining]; O.C. Okafor, After Martyrdom: Inter-
national L.aw, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of Legitimate Statehood in
Aftica 41 Hanv. IN'r'r L. J. 503, 506-508 (2000) [hereinafter \fier Martyrdoml.
See also G. LopSCHen, BEYONo Cserury: IVrPnNnnONar. COOpeRATION AND THE
GLosaL RepucBp Cntsts, 12, 78 (Oxford University Press 1993); Aristide R.
7-olberg, The Specter of Annrchy: African States Verging on Dissolution 39 Dts-
ser.rr 303 (2002).
1 See, Refugees by Numbers, supra note 6.
s Loescher, supra note 6, at 152. See also, J.I. Garvey, Toward a ReforYnulation
of Internationat Refugee I'aw,26 Hnnv. [mr'r, L. J. 483, 492 (1985).
e For example, in conformity with this tendency in the literature, the contributors
to a major 1997 symposium on forced displacement in Nigeria focused on the ways
in which human development projects, ecological disasters, resource depletion,
poverty, violent conflicts, ethnic rivalries, and internal power struggles have com-
bined in varying formations to generate forced displacement in Nigeria. While
always skirting around the question, there is little explicit recognition in the collec-
tion of essays of the deeper malaise at work, i.e. Nigeria's structural legitimacy
crisis. See generally, P. E. Lovejoy & P.A.T. Williams, eds., 32 J. AsnN & Arn.
Srun. 1 (199?). See also, T. Falola Nigeria in the Global Context of Refugees:
Historical and Comparative Perspectives, 32 J. AsInN & Arn. Srun. 5, 7-10
(1997); L. Dare, Political Instability and Displacement in Nigeria,32 J. Astex &
An'n. Sruo. 22 (1997); M.D. Levin, The New Nigeria: Displacement and the Na'
tion, 32 J. AsrnN & Arn. Sruo. 134,138 (1997); P.A.T. Williams, Religion, Vio-
notable scholars have explicitly connected some aspect of the structure of
the post-colonial African state to the tendency of such states to produce
relatively large-scale refugee flows.lO The point is that this alternative
structural approach has hardly been the norFn, even in those sections of the
literature that have focused on refugee issues in Africa. Few scholars have
approached the search for the root causes of mass refugee outflows from
post-colonial African states (such as Nigeria) by focusing, for the most part,
on the fundamental structural crises faced by such states (as opposed to the
governance crises that these states face).
It is not surprising then that relatively very few scholars have to
date articulated explicitly the deep connections that, in our considered view,
do exist between the contemporary structura.I crisis of legitimate statehood
that afflicts the post-colonial Nigerian state, on the one hand, and that coun-
try's looming (rf not already simmering) large-scale refugee crisis, on the
other hand. Most scholars have skirted this deeper question, preferring in
most cases to focus on its symptoms-such as inter-ethnic rivalries and
violence. This relative scholarly neglect is, in this particular case, particu-
larly significant given that nearly one in five Africans, and one in two West
Africans, live in Nigeria.rr
In this Article, I want to flesh out the extremely close connection
between the on-going structural crisis of legitimate statehood that is faced
by Nigeria, and a looming crisis of refugeehood in that country. Further-
more, I want to consider the relative cognitive failures that have attended
this linkage and proffer a number of suggestions that might help avert a
possible humanitarian crisis in Nigeria of a proportion that is unprecedented
anywhere in Africa. Two overarching arguments will be canvassed in this
Article: (a) that Nigeria is currently experiencing a significant intensifica-
tion of its historically continuous strzctural cnsis of legitimate statehood;
and if left unaddressed, this simmering crisis may eventually boil over and
explode into a nation-wide conflict that will create a refugee crisis in Africa
of unprecedented proportions, and (b) that since it is such dramatic explo-
lence and Displacement in Nigeria, 32 L Asreu & Arn. Sruo. 33, 43-43 (1997).
See also Levitt, supra note 4, at 43-44.
r0 See, A. 7-olberg, supra note 6; M. wa Mutua, The Interaction between Human
Rights, Dernocracy and Governance and the Displacement of Populatiorzs, Special
Issue INr'r. J. R.eFUceeL.37,at42,43 (1995);A. N. M. Abdullahi, infra,noteL4;
L.E, Schafer, infra, note 40.
1r Africa Population Database- Summary Table, available at http:llgnd2.cr.usgs.
gov/globalpoplafricalapp-2.php3 (last visited January 25,2402). See also, Nigeria
Population, available at http://www,yahooligans.com/reference/factbook/ni/
popula.htrnl (last visited January 25,2W2).
sions in the numbers of asylum-seekers worldwide that have in the past led
to attempts by the more powerful refugee-receiving states to subvert the
international refugee protection regime, a large-scale refugee crisis in Nige-
ria is likely to exacerbate that tendency-hence the need for closer and
more serious attention to be paid to the early warning signs of a looming
refugee crisis in Nigeria.
To this end, I have organized the Article into five sections. In Part
II, I will attempt to demonstrate my claim that the Nigerian state currently
faces an intense structural legitimacy crisis-a crisis regarding its funda-
mental architecture-one that is heightening. In my stride, I comment on
several instantiations of this crisis. Here, I also seek to make the connection
between this heightening structural crisis and a looming refugee crisis of
immense proportion, and discuss several examples of forced displacement
in Nigeria that have a close connection to the structural crisis faced by the
Nigerian state. In Part III, I discuss the cognitive deficit that marks the
domestic and international assessments of, and approaches to, the current
Nigerian situation. In Part IV, I ponder the outlines of a number of more
adequate responses to the looming crisis-responses that might point the
way toward a more effective and enduring resolution of Nigeria's crisis of
legitimate statehood. The Article concludes in Part V with a summary of
my arguments and an attempt at drawing a linkage between the avoidance
of more large-scale refugee outflows (such as the one that would most
likely result from a failure to address the structural crisis that currently af-
flicts the Nigerian state), and the on-going struggle to preserve and enhance
an international refugee protection system that is under assault.
One must recognize, however, that it is not yet doomsday in Nige-
ria; violent conflicts ate not a peculiarly Nigerian phenomenon; and the
Nigerian political elite has (apart from on one occasion) exhibited a rela-
tively remarkable ability to avoid the outbreak of violent conflicts on a na-
tional scale. Nevertheless, the crucial point is that to pre-empt an
unprecedented countrywide conflagration, all of the relevant actors must
now take Nigeria's structural legitimacy crisis much more seriously. Such
an approach will not only help avoid a large-scale refugee crisis in Nigeria,
but also help to defend, preserve and enhance the international refugee pro-
tection system, albeit indirectly.
[I. THe Srnucrunnr- CRrsts or Lecrrll,tere SrRreHooD w Nrcnrua
ervn TnB PRopucrtoN or RnrucEEHooD
The reality is that we have just about reached a point when
the majority of Nigerians are insisting that something is
wrong with this country which needs to be corrected at
once and for all times.rz
This excerpt from Reuben Abati's incisive commentary on the state
of the Nigerian pohty is indicative of the fundamental and urgent nature of
the structural crisis that afflicts the Nigerian state. It is also indicative of
the fact that most discerning Nigerians have come to realise that the govern-
ance cisis that afflicts the Nigerian state (relating to democratization,
human rights, official comrption, etc) is itself largely framed by, and con-
nected to, a more fundamental problem with the very architecture of the
Nigerian polity-a problem that relates to the perceived fairness and legiti
macy of the structural relationships among Nigeria's constituent sub-poli-
ties or sub-state groups. Thus, Abati's commentary is also indicative of the
fact that most discerning Nigerians have now come to realise that the solu-
tions to the governance cises that face their countr5/ are, to a large extent,
dependent on the resolution of the structural crisis of legitimate statehood
that Nigeria has faced from its very inception as a corporate entity.
This structural crisis is manifested today in the sffuggles and in-
tense disputes that continue to threaten national harmony in that country,
and which relate to the question of the fairness and legitimacy of the struc-
tural atangements that charactertze the Nigerian state. For instance, in-
tense (and at times violent) struggles continue to be waged in Nigeria
:rmong its constituent sub-polities about:
(a) A perceived lack of true federalism and regional autonomy-the
concentration of governance power at the centre, at the expense of
the constituent states and local govemment authorities-levels of
government that are comparatively more susceptible to control by
the more nationally powerless sub-state groups.r3
rz See R. Abati, The Guardian, supra note 1, at 2.
13 O. Solarin, Nigertan Federalism: The Lessonfrom Odi, NlcsRtA WonLD, avail-
able at http:l/nigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/solarin/federalism-odi.htm (last
visited November 25,2001) ("What obtains in Nigeria though is a de jure federal-
ism and de facto unitarianism. We have a rampaging federal government whose
briefs have no limits, so that it treats the federating units as supplicating vassals").
See also B.O. Nwnnueze, FEDERALTsM rbr NrcBnra UNDER rHe PnnsrpeNntal. CoN-
srTrurroN l(Sweet & Maxwell 1983) ("but more than the separate existence of an
apparatus of govemmento autonomy requires that each government must exist, not
as an appendage of another government, but as an autonomous entity in the sense
of being able to exercise its own will in the conduct of its affairs, free from direc-
tion by another govemment." He added: "An arrangement, such as existed in Nige-
ria under the military regime, which legally obliges one government to accept
(b) Resource control-which levels of government, and therefore
which sub-state groups, ought to exercise primary control over
Nigeria's oil wealth, bearing in mind that this resource accounts
for over 90Vo of that country's foreign exchange earnings?la
(c) The national revenue allocation formula-regardless of which
group(s) primarily control(s) the oil wealth of the country, accord-
ing to what fair formula ought the proceeds from the sale of that
oil wealth be shared among the different levels of government, i.e.
the centre, states, and local government areas?rs
direction from another on the condust of its affairs is not federalism in the true
sense of the word.").
14 I.L Glenn, The Niger Delta Problems and Solutions: The Equilateral Resource
Control (ERC) Model: An Altemative Dispute Resolution, NrceRIA WonLo, 4f
http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/ikpatt/resource-control.htm (last visited
October 25,2001) ("The prevailing concept of federalism in Nigeria today falls
short of expectations in both definition and practice. To the extent that it is being
practiced as quasi-federalism, there has been an overly centralized control of re-
sources by the Federal Govemment. This aberration continues to generate perpetual
conflict with indigenous rights, hence it has become a major cause of conflict in
Niger Delta. . . ."). See also Prof. O. Omoruyi, South- South Agenda of Liberation
in Nigeria: What is to be done?, at http:llngeriaworld.comlfeature/publication/
omoruyi/agenda.html (last visited January 25,2A0D ('"The majority ethnic nation-
alities in varying degrees controlled the Federal Government and have been con-
spiring to deny the area their right to control local resources since independence.").
iee also, A.N.M. A$ullahi, The Refugee Crisis in Africa as a Crisis of the Institu-
tion of the State,6 IJRL 562, 567 (L994) ("the appropriation of state resources by
one ethnic community to the exclusion of the others further aggmvates the crisis'
The monopolization of such resources by one ethnic community to the exclusion of
the all others leads in turn to the formation of groups of community with varying
interests, some wanting to destroy the state, while others want just to maintain the
status qua.").
15 Nwabueze, supra note 13, at L84 ("Considering that the state government de-
pended on federally collected revenue for over gOTo of ttreir total financial re-
sources, a 25Vo share of that revenue for them clearly created a glaringly and
unacceptable imbalance in the financial resources of the two tiers of government.
The Federal Government was thereby put in a position of financial superiority
which is not at all consistent with the principle of autonomy of each tier of govern-
ment in the Federal system."), Id. at 185 ("The state government had been reduced
to such a position of financial inferiority of having, as it were, to go cap in hand to
the Federal Government for subventions which the latter granted or refused entirely
in its discretion"). Id. at I94. ( "financial independence is thus indispensable to real
independence in legislative and executive matters. The principle must therefore be
accept€d that federalism requires that both the general and regional government
(d) The establishment of state police forces-should the states be
allowed to establish and run their own police forces, as opposed to
the existence of a single national police force controlled by the
central government, as is presently the case?r6
(e) The institution of sharia crtminal law in certain Northem Nigerian
States-should these states be allowed to continue operating sharia
criminal legal systems; should certain aspects of that system be
outlawed as unconstitutional?r?
must each have under its own independent control the financial resources necessary
for the performance of its exclusive functions").
16 Nwabueze, supra, note 13, at 124 ("it is incompatible with the autonomy of a
state govemment under a federal system that the only organised coercive force on
which it relies to maintain its authority and to enforce its law should be under the
control of the federal govemment through the power to appoint and remove its head
and commander. The autonomy of the state govemments does certainly require that
the appointment and removal of Inspector- General should either be a joint respon-
sibility or be vested in a non-partisan body. That is necessary in order that the
arrangement of single police may be reconciled with it."). See also, E.U. Obi,
Federal and State Police in Nigeria: Matters of Jurisdiction, Checks and Balances,
NrcBnrl. Wonro, available at htE/lntgeriaworld.com/feature/publication/obi/po-
lice2.htrnl (last visited October 25, 200I) ("To carry out decentralization of the
police, the political structure of the govemment must be taken into account. ALL
[sic] levels of government namely local, state and federal must share the responsi-
bility of law enforcement. Therefore, the [local govemment] must take responsibil-
ity for municipal policing, the state for state police and federal for federal offences
and matters that cut across state boundaries.").
r7 S.U. Nwabuzor, Religion, Pilgrimnge and Hoax Secularity in Nigeria, NrceRrn
Woxt-o, available at http:llrrrgeriaworld.com/feature/publication/nwabuzor/secular-
ity_hoax.htm (last visited October 25,200I) ("The Sharia is an albatross hanging
on the Nigerian nation. No amount of palliative measures, comments and assur-
ances would help. The only solution is separation of state and religion in its en-
tirety. Anything less means a new blueprint for the Nigerian nation needs to be
drawn. The draftsmen are waiting to receive the green light. Hopefully this will not
entail the use of force and needless loss of lives."). See also O. Gideon, Why
Shnria then and Why Sharia Now?, Ntcpnn 'WonLD, available at htp:llnigeria
world.com/featarelarticlelsharia_why-now.htrnl (last visited October 25, 2A0D
("The issues of religious freedom and way of life must rest solely with their various
groups. For a religion to be free in Nigeria, it must be freely practiced and freely
abandoned-individual choice of religion and religious association must not be
curtailed by the State or by the Religious Sects be it Christian faith or Moslem
faith. The advocacy and implementation of Sharia law is in total variance with
religious freedom as it hinders freedom of non-Moslem, freedom of Moslems and
funded by the revenue that is not purely Moslems."). See also, R. Abati, Oputa:
(fl Calls for a sovereign national conference-should all of Nigeria's
constituent sub-state $oups convene, on the basis of rough equal-
ity, a sovereign conference that will be charged with negotiating a
fair, and therefore durable, architecture for the Nigerian state (i.e.
the fundamentals of their relationships to each other, rather than
continue to endure (often violent) conflicts that are deeply con-
nected to the non-resolution of this question?l8
The urgent need for Nigeria to confront and come to terms with its
extremely serious structural crisis is evident from the intensity of the (at
times very violent) conflicts and conflaglations that have attended many of
the above struggles. For instance, in 1999 November, the Nigerian Army
attacked and destroyed almost completely the town of Odi in the Nigerian
Niger Delta.re Odi's destruction was the culmination of a violent confronta-
tion between the Nigerian state and militant Ijaw youth. Frustrated by
nearly forty years of impoverishment and neglect by successive central gov-
ernments, despite producing most of Nigeria's oil wealth, these militants
had attacked and killed several police officers that had been posted to the
area in order to maintain a safe environment for the production of oil.20
What was both shocking and instructive about this extremely violent repri-
sal attack was the response of the Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo.
The End of the Beginning, Tne GuanpIAN ONr-nw, available at http:llwww.ngr
guardiannews.com (last visited October 24, 2O0I).
18 Tse Guanotlr.ni., Beyond the Oputa Panel, available at httpllwww.ngrguardian
news.com ("We believe that the evidence the Panel has gathered on the vexed Na-
tional Question is clearest case that can be made for the convocation of a national
conference. This is because the cries of marginalisation from east to west, and north
to south are symptomatic of deep-seated resentrnent the various ethnic nationalities
feel about the Nigerian State. How to assuage these ill-feelings and formulate an
administrative machinery of collective desire should be among the primary con-
cerns of the national conference."). See a/so S.U. Nwabuzor, The Imperatives of
Sovereign national Conference: The Past as a Guide, Nlcenta WonI-o available at
http://nigeriaworld.com/feah-rre/publication/nwabuzor/snc.htm1 (last visited October
25,200L\.
1e Genocide in Odi, available at: http:lllists.essential.orglshell-nigeria-action/msg
00701.htm1 (last visited October 6, 2000).
20 Id. (The twenty-nine human rights groups that visited Odi in December 1999
observed: 'That the events in Odi cannot be isolated from the larger crises in the
Niger Delta which have their root in the historical political alienation, economic
deprivation, envfuonmental devastation, physical brutalisation and psychological
traumatisation of the people by the oppressive Nigerian State and exploitative mul-
tinational oil corporations.").
While expressing some regret for the massive loss of lives and destruction
that attended his Army's campaign to arrest the suspected killers of the
police officers, Obasanjo refused to apologise for the Army's actions and
seemed to imply that such use of force was legitimate.zt
Observers of the Nigerian scene were therefore not surprised when,
in October 2441, the Nigerian Army was accused of killing over two hun-
dred civilians in the village of hki Biam in the middle-belt region of North-
ern Nigeria.22 While this incident was not connected with the struggle over
the control of Nigeria's oil wealth, it was just as troubling and just as con'
nected to Nigeria's structural legitimacy crisis. By all accounts, the Tnki
Biam massacres were connected to a decade old struggle for power and
resources between the Tiv and Jukun, two of Nigeria's many minority sub-
state groups.B In response to the kidnapping and murder of a number of
Nigerian soldiers, who were said to be on a peace-enforcement mission in
that area, the Nigerian Army had raided hki Biam and are alleged to have
shot over two hundred unarmed civilian males in cold blood.2a While the
exact motivation for the alleged massacres remains unclear, it is not in
2L A. Osuntokun, From Odi to Benue: A Law and Order Challenge, NrcBnre
WoRrD, available at htqf/nigeriaworld.comftettercl200l/nov/06tf.html (last vis-
ited Novembet 7,2001). ("On a visit to Odi a while ago the president merely reiter-
ated his initial reaction-to the effect that the military action against the
community was regrettable but merits no apology because he had committed no
wrong in authorizing an invasion of the town to fish out the killers of 12 policemen
in order to stem the slide into anarchy.").
22 D. Doran, Nigeria's Obasanjo under Fire over Army Massacres, available at
http://dailynews.yahoo .com/Wnml2}Oll026lwUnigeria-killings-dc-8.html (Iast
visited October n ,200I) ("Reuters journalists who visited Zaki-Biam, at the center
of the latest violence, saw the town of some 50,000 razed to the ground with more
residents hiding in the bush since the invasion. . . ." Adding,'osince Obasanjo came
to power the President has asked the army to level a town in Bayelsa state called
Odi . . . Now the army has levelled a much larger area. Over 500 are dead." lQuot-
ing Gabriel Suswam House of Representatives Member representing Katsina Ala,
Logo, Ukum Federal Constituencyl).
23 P. Jason, Tht Gathering Storm, VaNcuano, available athttp:llwww.vanguard
ngr. com/ne w s I articles | 200 l/october/30 1 0200 1 1c30200 I .htm (last visited October
30, 2001) ("Today we have on our hands a festering but often forgotten war among
the three Middle Belt states of Benue, Nassarawa and Taraba. Thousands of lives
have been lost, including those of 19 soldiers who were killed not by an external
aggressor, but by fellow citizens. Several other thousands have been made refugees
in their own counffy. Property worth millions of naira [sic] has been destroyed in
the needless war that needs urgent attention.").
24 Doran, supra note 22.
doubt that these civilians were shot dead by Nigerian soldiers. once again,
and as shockingly, the Nigeria President refused to apologise for these kill-
ings and even appeared to imply that the soldiers were entitled to act in the
way in which they were alleged to act in the interest of preserving national
order.2s
Other such serious incidents of violence have occurred-incidents
that reflect the growing intensity of Nigeria's structural legitimacy crisis.
Over the last two years, a number of violent clashes leading to the loss of
thousands of lives have occurred in some Northern Nigerian states concern-
ing the introduction of sharia criminal legal systems.26 For instance, in
Kaduna state, thousands of people have been killed as a result of one such
violent struggle.2T
Again, in South-Eastern Nigeria, the Movement for the Survival of
Biafra (MASSOB) has for at least three years now been locked in an often
violent, but generally low intensity, struggle with the central government.28
2s Osuntokun, supra note 21 ("The way you should look at it is this. If a situation
arises where a policeman will say' now you will send me there, if anything happens
to me. . .they can just kill me as they like; . . .your own life will not be safe. Your
own life will not be secure. . .for young men to carry guns and shoot at soldiers;
you don't think that is dangerous? Whatever else soldiers are taught to be or not to
be they are taught to fight in self-defence." [Quoting President Olusegun
Obasanjol).
26 The End of the Beginning, supra note 17 ("In Zamfara state the Sharia has been
introduced as a legal orthodoxy, contrary to the nation's constitution. In the name
of the Sharia and Islam, peoples' hands are being amputated for minor crimes.
Innocent women are being flogged. A 30 year old single lady who has been put in
the family way has been sentenced to death for stoning; she is adjudged guilty of
adultery while the father of her unborn child has been declared free by the sharia
court for want of evidence. . . . In the last two years alone, we have had religious
riots in Shagamu, Jos, Kaduna and Kanoo resulting in the loss of lives and
property.").
27 C. Nwangwu, Sharia-related Killing and Carnage in Kaduna re-enact deadly
prologue to Nigeria-Biafra War, of 1967, available at http://www.usafricaonline.
com/shariashowdown_chido.html (last visited June 21, 2001).
2E See Nigeria: Focus on New Biafra Movement,IRIN, available athttp:llwww.
reliefweb.int/IRlN/wa/countrystories/nigeria/20000524.phtm1 (last visited March 5,
2001). See also, R. Okonkwo, An Evening with Biafra: A Reporter's Notebook,
availab le at http:/inigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/okonkwo/04240 I .html
(last visited April 25, 2001); P.Okoronkwo, Rethinking Ethnic Identity and the
Right to Self-Determination of Peoples Under International Law: The Nigerian Ex-
ample l7I (2001\ (unpublished LL.M. Thesis, Dalhousie Law School, Dalhousie
University) (on file with author).
This struggle concerns the movement's stated ambition of acnralizing the
failed late 1960s attempt by the then Eastern Region to secede from the
Nigerian state under the name and style of the de facto independent Repub-
lic of Biafra.2e Set against the shident and very popular demands by many
prominent Igbos for one of their kin to be enthroned as Nigeria's president,
it becomes apparent that the perceived structural exclusion of Igbos from
the centres of power in Nigeria is viewed very seriously among the mem-
bers of this major Nigerian sub-state group.
A similar centrifugal tendency is evident in the activities in Western
Nigeria of the O'dua Peoples Congress (OPC), a militant pan-Yoruba
movement.3o In any case, this organization's recent clash with the Nigerian
police in llorin, concerning the traditional rulership of that Yoruba city by a
Fulani Emir, is indicative of the violence that is often produced by the un-
resolved structural crisis that afflicts the Nigerian state.3r
As instructively, if less violently, it is noteworthy that one of the
reasons for the absence of a formidable opposition caucus in the Nigerian
parliament has been the fact that one of the two opposition parties, confined
as it almost is to a Yoruba base, has, despite the fact that the central govern-
ment is controlled by another party, tended to act as the vanguard rather
than as antagonists of the current President, himself a prominent Yoruba
2e C.R. Nixon, Self-deterrnination: The Nigerian/Biafra Case,24 Wonm Polrr-
tcs 473,475 (1972). On 30 May 1967 Eastern Region of Nigeria was declared a
sovereign independent state 1967 by the name Biafra. See also, P. Okoronkwo, id.
at 137.
30 See S.U. Nwabuzor, The Paradox of Nigeria's Ethnic Militias, NtcenrA
WoRLD, available at http:llnigeriaworld.corn/feature/publication/nwabuzor/mili-
tias.hfrnl (last visited October 25,200L).
3r A.A. Mazrui, The Af,rican State as a Political Refugee: Institutional Collapse
and Human Displacemenf, Iwt't- J. RerucBe L.21,31 (1995) ( "What ought to be
remembered, therefore is that state-system which Africa has inherited from Europe
was originally nurtured in the bosom of conflict and war.") Id. at32 ("Post-colonial
Africa is disproportionately burdened with intemalised conflict which is, at least in
the short run, detrimental both to the consolidation of statehood and to the promo-
tion of a shared sense of nationhood in the population"). See also, C,R. Ezntah,
International Law of Self-Determiwtion and the Ogoni Question: Mirroring Af'
rica's Post-Colonial Dilemma, 19 Lov. L.A. INI'I- & Co*rp, L. J. 811, 856 (1997)
("L,ooking at our variable and factual lenses, such as 'egregious human rights viola-
tions,' it is clear that the contemporary law of self-determination is inadequate to
accommodate the African problem. Its principles can only be reactive in the Afri-
can context where ethnic conflicts are imminent. This is because colonial Africa
was built on ethnic division and post-colonial Africa preserved the inequities of
colonial Africa.").
leader.32 This is clearly indicative of the ways in which this opposition
paffy is more concerned with maintaining the control of the Nigerian gov-
ernment by a member of the sub-state group from which it draws its basic
support than with ensuring the accountability of the ruling party. This pro-
vides another clear indication of the way in which Nigeria's fundamental
structural problem (in this case evidenced by a significant level of deep
rooted suspicion among its constituent sub-state groups) has led to a serious
governance problem.
Although most of these episodes have resulted in violent conflicts,
they have yet to lead to a nation-wide conflagration. However, this is not as
comforting as it could be. The principal reason for caution is the nature of
Nigeria's historical experience.33 The years immediately before the Niger-
ian civil war of L967-1970 were in fact characteiznd by similar pattems of
deep-rooted, unresolved, localized, low-intensity conflicts.3a As worrisome
is the fact that more than ever before since the end of that war, Nigerian
politicians and commentators now tend to harness and deploy flashbacks to
32 U.J. Evrer-oNyn, THE GovsRNANcs ScoxscnRp: RBvEw oF DevrocRnnc
GovenNeNce nr Nrcenra (Hurilaws 2000), available at http:llwww.ned.org/grant-
ees/hurilaw/scorecard2000/two.htrnl (last visited January 30,2OO2) ("The AD ap-
peared contented with the fact that the President comes from South West of the
nation. It appears that the party is even threatening to tear the country apart should
anything happen to the President, to the chagrin of those who solidly stood behind
him at the polls.").
33 K.W.J. Post, /s There a Case for Binfra?,44 h.rr'r- Arr.26,27 (1968) (Nigeria
is a pluralistic society comprising of about 250 ethnic goups is a product of British
political experimentation through the amalgamation of L914).
34 For instance in 1950, the North threatened to secede at the lbadan constitutional
conference if they were not granted fifty percent of the seats at the federal legisla-
ture. Seq Tekena N. Tamuno, Separatist Agitations in Nigeria since 1914,8 J.
Moo. Arn. Sruo. 563, 566 (1970). Also in 1956, Northern Nigeria thrcatened
again to secede if Nigeria was granted independence in 1956. See, A. Beu-o, MY
Lrrr, LI4-120 (Cambridge University Press 1962). Furthermore, during this period
there was a leadership crisis in the Action Group Party (based in the western re-
gion) which led to the imposition of a state emergency in that region by the North-
ern controlled federal government. See, Tamuno, supra note 34 at 573. Again,
Nigerian unity was threatened by the federal election of 1964, which was alleged to
have been massively rigged. This prompted the Leader of NCNC, Dr. Okpara, to
declare the desire of the Eastern region to secede. Id. at 574-575. Furthermore, on
29th May 1966, Northerners massacred several thousands of Easterners mostly
Igbos while protesting against Decree 34 of 1966 that introduced the unitary system
of government in Nigeria. V.O. BenT rus, Tun DvNavIc or SncesstoN 122 (Cam-
bridge University Press 1999).
that crisis as part of the imagery of their public.3s This is a disturbing in-
sight into their mental attitudes regarding Nigeria's structural legitimacy
crisis.
Now, it is impoftant to understand that there is virtually nothing
that should be surprising or peculiar about the fact that Nigeria now faces,
and has always faced a crisis regarding the nature and fairness of its very
architecture. For one, almost every post-colonial African state (such as Ni-
geria) has faced this kind of crisis of legitimate statehood (as opposed to a
governance crisis) from its very inception, and even before that point.36
Most post-colonial African states have suffered this kind of fundamental
crisis continuously from the late 19th century to the present day.tt As has
already been demonstrated elsewhere, during their late pre-colonial, colo-
nial, and post-colonial eras, the state-building practices of the preceding era
structured and shaped the nature of the African state that emerged in the
succeeding era.38 "Thus, late nineteenth-century, pre-colonial state-building
led to a colonial African state that was a deeply divided, intensely frag-
mented, highly violent, and rarely legitimate agglomeration of several dis-
tinct nations and political communities."3e "Similarly, the coercive and
dictatorial colonial state-building practices created an intensely divided and
fragmented post-colonial African state, which was, more often than not,
viewed by the relevant constituent sub-state groups as illegitimate (and
which, all too often, did very little to shed its inherited illegitimacy)."4o
3s O. Adigwe, Obasanjo: A Demagogue?, Nrcemn WonLo, available athttp:ll
nigeriaworld.comAettersl2}OVmarlZ33.html (last visited March 28,200I) ("Do not
forget that the Biafran war that almost divided this country was caused by resource
control. If Biafra had won, I would have been dead, your governor would not have
been in the position he is today" [quoting Mr. Olusegun Obasanjo President of the
Federal Republic of Nigerial).
36 See, After Martyrdom, supra, note 6, at 506-514. For a book-length develop-
ment of this point in relation to the role of international law in facilitating its
debilitating effects, see Re-Defining, supra, note 6, at 59-77.
37 After Martyrdom, supra, note 6, at 506-507.
38 Id.
3e Id, at 506.
40 Id. See also, L.E. Schafer, Learning from Rwanda: Addressing the Global In-
stitutional Stalemate in Refugee Crises, 6 INo. J. GLoeaL Lecnl Sruo. 3I5,324
(19%) ("Preserving the states formed by colonization ensures continued political
tensions among several ethnic groups that comprise developing states. As violence
is ignited and repeatedly erupts in ethnically diverse nations, refugee flows become
more problematic and complex.").
Moreover, it should hardly be news to a keen observer of Nigeria's
internal politics thal the relationship among its constituent sub-state groups
has, for the most part, been very problematic. Nigeria's constituent units
have, quite understandably, always struggled for relative power. But, more
importantly, many of these struggles have concerned their fruitless search
for a much more acceptable modus vivendi among themselves-a Luge
group of over 250 constituent sub-polities. Given the unfortunate history of
Nigeria's pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial state-building ethos and
practices, the persistence and intensity of such struggles for a more legiti-
mate political architecture should not be surprising. Few serious scholars
would expect a relatively sudden, forcible, agglomeration of Canada, the
USA, and Mexico by a colonial conqueror into one political entity not to
result (at least in the short-term) in a broader emergent society that is char-
acterized by more or less intense cleavage and competition largely along the
pre-existing fault lines. However, if the foregoing analysis is correct, then
observers of the Nigerian scene ought not be surprised about the endurance
of a similar condition in a country that was almost suddenly created by a
colonial power through the forcible agglomeration, for the most part, of
over 250 already existing, much more organically formed polities. While
such conflict generating circumstances and conditions can be either amelio-
rated or exacerbated by the policies and actions of the governments of the
newly created agglomeration, their very presence presents a most formida-
ble challenge to statecraft.
That is not to say though that Nigeria's structural legitimacy crisis
does not deserve redemptive attention. Surely, it does. Nigeria is home to
approximately one fifth of Africa's population and some of the largest
reserves of oil in the world. The occurrence of a second nation-wide vio-
lent conflict in that country will undoubtedly result in untold human sutTer-
ing not just in Africa but the world over as well. However, if left
unaddressed for much longer, Nigeria's structural legitimacy crisis may
well lead to exactly that result. The horizon remains blurry to the eye but
the warning signs of a gathering storm have appeared all over it. As Reuben
Abati has gravely put it, such a potential conflict:
. . .would effectively mark the end of Nigeria as we know
it, and there are enough people in this land who believe that
the best solution to all the heartache and stomach upset we
live with, is a redrawing of the Nigerian map'4r
If this sort of situation materializes, then the refugee crisis that it could
generate would be so serious that, given the tendency of some powerful
4r See Abat, supra note 1.
states to assault the international refugee protection system in times of mass
refugee flows, current campaigns and efforts to preserve and enhance that
system could be hampered.
Thousands of Nigerians have, at one time or the other in the last
two years or so, been intemally displaced by violent conflicts related to
Nigeria's structural legitimacy crisis. Thousands were, and remain, dis-
placed by the "sharia-related" conflicts in Kaduna.+z Thousands more were
displaced by the bloody destruction of Odi in the Nigerian Niger Delta,4:
and the alleged massacre of civilians in Zaki Biam.a A similar number of
Nigerians remain displaced from parts of Nassarawa state in North Central
Nigeria due to intermittent fighting related to Nigeria's crisis of legitimate
statehood.a5
In the following section, I will discuss what I see as the glaring
cognitive and other deficits that mark the domestic and intemational assess-
ments of, and approaches to, the current Nigerian situation-what I per-
ceive as the failure to take as seriously as is both possible and necessary, the
existence of a crisis of legitimate statehood in Nigeria that could result
eventually in a humanitarian catastrophe.
42 C. Nwangwa, Sharia-related Killings and. Carnage in Kaduna Re-enact Deadly
Prologue to Nigeria-Biafra War of 1967, available at http://www.usafricaonline.
com/shariashowdown-chido.htrnl (last visited June 21, 200 1 ).
43 Genocide in Odi, available dt http:/nis$.essential.org/shell-nigeria-action/msg
00701.htm1 (last visited October 6, 2000) (The twenty-nine human rights groups
that visited Odi after the massacre observed that: "We saw no single livestock,
poultry or domestic animals except a stray cat. The community's 60,000 inhabitants
had tied into the forest or been arrested or killed. Only a few thoroughly trau-
matised old women, old men and children could be seen around, some of them
suffering from fractures and other injuries sustained while trying to escape from the
advancing soldiers.").
u Doran, supra note 22. See also, G. McKenzie, Nigeria Army Massacre Evi-
dence Shown, available at hnp:lldailynews.yahoo.comhlapl200ll025/wUnigeria-
violence-6.htrnl (last visited October 26, 20Ol).
45 Jason, supra note 23 ("In the sixties, one of the precursors to the calamities that
fully bloomed on 15th January 1966, was the Tiv riot. Today we have on our hands
a festering but often forgotten war among the three Middle Belt states of Benue,
Nassarawa and Taraba. Thousands of lives have been lost, including those of 19
soldiers who were killed not by an external aggressor, but by fellow citizens. Sev-
eral other thousands have been made refugees in their own country. Property worth
millions of naira has been destroyed in a needless war that needs urgent attention.")
III. Tue Cocxrrlve Denrcrrs rN THE Dorraesrrc
aNp INTeRNATToNAL ORpens
In the foregoing section, the point was made at length that there are
palpable early warning signs of a looming (though not inevitable) large-
scale refugee crisis in Africa's most populous country. However, the palpa-
bility of these early waming signs does not seem to have elicited a coffe-
sponding level of awareness and cognition in the extant domestic and
international legal orders. In other words, there has been a manifest cogni-
tive deficit in both the domestic and international responses to the structural
legitimacy crisis that afflicts the Nigerian state, and its potential to produce
refugeehood on an unprecedented scale.
Nigeria's domestic governance institutions seem to be as guilty of
this cognitive failure as any other entity. All too often, these institutions
have failed to confront and tackle effectively the roots of this fundamental
structural crisis. These institutions have preferred to tinker superficially
with this serious and highly consequential problem. As importantly, all too
often, these institutions have failed to connect the fact of the persistence of
this structural crisis with the real possibility of a national humanitarian ca-
tastrophe. For instance, not once in Nigeria's corporate history has the ruo-
dus vivendi which must guide the relationships among its sub-state groups
been legitimated directly by the representatives of these constituent units.46
46 For instance, the amalgamation of 1914 that gave birth to Nigeria was done
without seeking the consent of the people through a referendum, this made one
time Premier of Western Nigeria as well as former Federal Minister of Finance
Obafemi Awolowo argued that: "Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical
expression. There are no 'Nigerians' in the Same Sense as there are 'EngliSh',
'Welsh', or 'French.' The word 'Nigeria' is merely a distinctive appellation to dis-
tinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not."
M.G.K. Nayar, Self-determirntion Beyond the Colonial Context: Biafra in Restros-
pect, IO Te,x. Irqt'l L. J.321,324 (1975) (quoting O' Awolowo, PetH ro Nlcen-
nN Fnesoo1a at 47-48). Also, the various states creation exercises in Nigeria were
done without any input from the people. See, M. Nwachukwu, The Middle-Belt
and her Neighbours: Jos in Perspective, VaNcueRp, available at http:llwww.van
guardngr.com/news/articles/200l/September/l60920011sm616901.htm (last visited
Ocrober 25,2W2) ("The problem in the middle belt today is largely instigated by
the Hausa/Fulani. This is made possible by the fact that they appropriate state
machineries at their disposal in determining the fate of their younger siblings in the
region. Through the exercise of state creations they have succeeded in splitting
major ethnic groups and logging them with unrelated ethnic groups thereby creat-
ing new grounds for conflicts in the area ofculture, boundary dispute and religious
crises."). Further, the annulment of the June L2, L993 Presidential election and the
constitution of interim national government were done against the will of the peo-
Similarly, not once in Nigeria's corporate history has its constitution been,
for the most part, directly legitimated by the governed.aT Every one of Ni-
geria's many failed and failing architectural rurangements has been largely
imposed either by a colonial power or by a military junta.as Each of the
country's failed and failing constitutions has been largely imposed by either
a colonial power or a military regime.ae This is a rather remarkable kind of
continuity and persistence, albeit in a negative way, over nearly one hun-
dred years of a more or less/orcible process of structuring of the Nigerian
polity. Further evidence of the tendency within Nigeria's institutions of
governance to avoid confronting directly, and dealing with effectively the
deep-seated nature of the structural legitimacy crisis that afflicts the Niger-
ian state can be found in the summary dismissal by both the Executive and
Legislative branches of government of the never endrng demands by vari-
ous sections of the country for the convening of a sovereign national con-
ference at which a much more legitimate architectural arrangement can be
negotiated for the country.so Rather than embrace this peaceable option
ple. See G.E. Moose, Nigeria: Which Way Forward?, avaihble at http:llwww.
nigerdeltacongress.com./narticles/nigeria%o2Dwhich%ol0wayVo20forward.htm (last
visited January 25,2002). See also Nigeria: AHistory of Coups, BBC News, Feb-
ruary 15, 1999, available at htE://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/special-repotll998l06l98l
after)abachal\3449.stm (last visited January 25 2W2).
47 The 1914 Constitution that vested both executive and legislative powers on the
Governor who was the Queen representative was imposed on Nigerians by Britain
as the colonial power. See, B. O. Nwagueza, A Col.rsrrrurronet- HrsroRY oF
NrceRrn 36 (C.Hurst & Company 1982). Under rhe 1922 Clifford Constitution
there was established a Legislative Council that legislated only for the Southern
Province. See, id. at 39. In 1946, the Richards Constitution that divided the coun-
try into three regions, was promulgated, and the constitution also brought the north-
ern province into the federal legislative :urangement, See, id. at 42. There was
another constirudon imposed on Nigerians in 1951 called the Macpherson Constitu-
tion. ,See id. at 46. In 1954, there was yet another constitution before the indepen-
dence constitution of 1960, however none of these constitutions derived their
authority from the people of Nigeria. See id. at 52-61. Even the 1979 Constitution
that returned the country to civilian democracy did not derive its authority from the
people. See id. at 253-254. Similarly, the present 1999 Constitution was also an
imposition by the military on Nigerian people as the then military dictator General
Abubakar simply promulgated the constitution without submitting it to a
referendum.
48 See supra note 46.
4e See supra note 47.
s0 The late Justice Minister Bola Ige declared that sovereign national conference is
no longer feasible. Dr. Chuba Okadigbo then Senate President described the call for
(one that could for the first time in Nigeria's history produce an architec-
tural arrangement and constitution that is legitimated directly by the sover-
eign representatives of ordinary Nigerians) these institutions of the Nigerian
government have chosen yet again to adopt a government controlled, and
imposed, process-one that tinkers superficially with the present political
anangement, and hardly recognizes the seriousness of Nigeria's structural
legitimacy crisis,sr There is also very little indication in the behaviour of
these institutions that they recognise the obvious benefits of tackling
squarely this structural affliction. For not only will a mass-based non-im-
posed process much more likely lead to a better and more effective end
product, the architectural turangement that is thus fashioned is itself much
more likely to become widely perceived as legitimate.s2 While the obvious
reluctance of the Nigerian government to open the "can of worms" of debat-
ing and negotiating the very structural legitimacy of the Nigerian state is
historically understandable given the history of Africa's post-colonial states
as hastily constituted, extremely fissiparous, highly inflammable entities, it
remains obvious nevertheless that to put off the peaceable resolution of this
the conference as "idle thinking". Dr. Doyin Okupe, Obasanjo's former media and
publicity adviser, described Sovereign national conference as a "spent force", and
Professor ABC Nwosu the former Obasanjo's Political Adviser now Minister of
Health contended that sovereign national conferencd is unconstitutional. As he put
it: "You cannot have two sovereign powers in Nigeria." See, Ben Eguzozie, Sover-
eign National Conference Is the Solution, Trueo, March 15, 2000, available at
http:i/allafrica.com/stories/200003150223.htm (last visited January 25,2002). See
also, Ken Wiwa, Whither Nigeria?, available athttp..llwww.africana.com/Column/
b l_views_49.htm (last visited January 25. 2002).
51 Id.
sz J. Okwara, Biafra, Odua and Arewa Republic: A case for Relative Good, Ntce-
RrA WonLn, available at http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/publicatior/okwara/
102901.htm1 (last visited October 29,200I) (wherein the author raised the follow-
ing questions: "How for instance, can we allow Muslims up north to operate sharia
without infringing on the rights of Christians? How can we tell Igbos not to agitate
for Biafra when they are being slaughtered at every turn in the north while the
Obasanjo government tums a blind eye. How can a section of the country continu-
ally constitute itself into a rebellious entity and make nonsense of the constitution
when it wants to pursue its agenda. How can we stop the criminal exploitation of
the peoples of the Niger Delta, which disregards their environmental and develop-
mental needs? How can we ensure that we have an ethnically balanced Army,
which oppresses no one but protects all? Again, how can we ensure that when a
section of the country is returned to power, the Nigerian Army is not again skewed
to favor their agenda of domination?").
fundamental problem is to encourage the violenf reconfiguration of the
Nigerian state.s3
As importantly, it is worthy of note that the international order has
also been as guilty of this kind of "head-in-the-sand posture"-of a cogni-
tive failure to clearly identify and confront head on the fundamental struc-
tural crisis that afflicts the Nigerian state. That order has also failed to
connect adequately the persistence of this structural crisis and the potential
production of large-scale refugeehood in Nigeria. It has, for the most part,
endorsed, and even licensed, the superficial tinkering approach that has
been preferred by successive Nigerian governments.sa
The point is not to argue unqualifiedly for more external interven-
tion in Nigeria's state-building quagmire. In fact, such interventions have
in the past formed part of the problem.ss However, bearing in mind the
extent to which such external interventions are already ubiquitous in Niger-
ian affairs,s6 the point that is being made is that, in relation to Nigeria's
serious structural legitimacy crisis and its potential to produce refugeehood
on a very large scale, the international order has exhibited a cognitive defr-
cit that is similar to that demonstrated by the Nigerian government. This
should not be surprising given the extent to which the international order
has in their process of legitimizing statehoodsT historically favoured "peer-
review" over "infra-review." This is to say that, in according legitimacy to
states, the international order has historically not been as coucerned as it
could be with the extent to which a state's internal architectural arrange-
ment is viewed as legitimate or illegitimate by its constituent sub-state
groups. The international order has been much more concerned with the
extent to which other states, its peers, view the relevant state as legitimate.ss
Put simply, the international order has not "cared" as much about the struc-
tural legitimacy crisis that afflicts post-colonial African states such as Nige-
ria. This being so, it has not been able so far to fashion out a system for
53 SeeM. Mutua, Putting Humpty Dumpty BackTogether Again: The Dilemnns of
the Post-Colonial African State, 2L Bnoox. J. Imr'l L. 505, 506 (1995).
54 See Re-Defining, supra note 6, Chpt. 3-4.
ss Nixon, supra note 29, at 495-496. See also, L.C. Bucsnerr, SECEssrou: THn
Lecrupracv on Selr-nnrenMrNArroN 17l (Yale University Press 1978); O. Nnoli,
The Nigeria-Bi"afra Conflict- A Political Analysis, in Ntcenre: Drr-BraNa.q, op Nn-
rroNHooD 129 (Joseph Okpaku, ed., Greenwood Publishing Co. L972).
s6 Shell in Nigeria, Conponarn WATcH, available ar http:www.corpwatch.org/
trac/feature/humanrts/cases/nb-shell.html (last visited October 3, 2000) ("In Nige-
ria, power does not flow from the people-it comes from Shell.").
57 See, Re-Defining, supra note 6, at 54-65.
58 Id.
dealing as much as is possible with this extremely important and conse-
quential issue. That is why the international order generally lacks a dedi-
cated, focused mechanism to deal with the architecture of relations among
the fissiparous sub-state groups that constitute most post-colonial states
(such as Nigeria).sg That is why early warning mechanisms that might de-
tect such structural crisis before they result in violent conflicts and mass
refugee outflows are either lacking or underdeveloped.
Having made the point at length that there are significant cognitive
deficits in both the domestic and international orders regarding the serious-
ness of Nigeria's structural legitimacy crisis, and its potpntial to explode
into a national humanitarian catastrophe, in the next section, I will consider
the outlines of a more adequate set of responses to that crisis-a set of
responses that might have a better chance of averting a major refugee crisis
in Nigeria-a situation that I argue must be avoided, at the very least, in the
interest of the non-exacerbation of the existing international refugee protec-
tion crisis.
fV. Townno l Mone Aoequere Respotlse ro rHE ON-Gontc
lNp LoourNc CrusBs rN Nrcenra
Given the historical tendencies of the domestic and international
orders to tinker superficially with, rather than address directly, the underly-
ing structural legitimacy crisis that afflicts the Nigerian state, it is no won-
der that this fundamental problem persists. It is also not surprising that this
problem now threatens to explode into a national humanitarian catastrophe
that would most likely generate a large-scale refugee crisis. As Abati has
noted, what has been needed all this time was for the relevant institutions to
address and tackle this problem head on, with a sense of urgency, and "once
and for all,"6o
A more effective response to this fundamental state-building prob-
lem, this crisis of legitimate statehood, requires processes and outcomes
that significantly enhance the legitimacy and legitimization of the architec-
tural arrangements of the Nigerian state-the structural relationshiPs or mo-
dus vivendi among its constituent sub-state groups. While no final solutions
are possible and no panaceas palpable, it seems that there are a number of
se See, G. Alfredsson and D. Turk, Internntional Mechnnisms for the Monitoring
and Protection of Minortry Rights: Their Advantages, Disadvantages, and Interre-
lationships, jn A. Bloeo, L. LetcHr. M. Now.qK AND A. Roses, nos., MoxttontNc
HtruraN Rrcnrs nq Eunope: Coupennrc Ir.rrenNarroblel- PnocEDURES aNo MecH-
ANrsMs 181 (A. Bloed, L. Leicht, M. Novak & A. Rosas, eds., Martinus Nijhotr
1993\.
60 See, Abati supra, note l.
things, both domestic and international, that can be done in pursuit of the
desired and desirable outcome
The first concerns process. It is essential that the process of the
peaceable re-configuration of the Nigerian state (in order to make its stnrc-
ture much more acceptable to its constituent sub-state groups) be under-
pinned by mass participation and as consensual a politics as possible. As
has already been demonshated, no such previous process in Nigeria has
been governed iargely by this approach.6t Every previous structural ar-
rangement and constitution has been imposed on Nigerians either by a colo-
nial power or an indigenous, but still grossly unrepresentative, military
regime.62 The substantive demands for much larger political autonomy by
the vast majority of Nigeria's sub-state entities must be taken more seri-
ously. This can be done by, as much as is possible, ensuring tft€ir mass
participation and consent to the process of re-configuring the Nigerian state.
Furthermore and just as importantly, if Nigeria is to reap more fully the
fruits of such a legitimated process, these constituent units must themselves
exercise sovereignry over that process. That is why nothing less than a
sovereign national conference of all of Nigeria's constituent nations is re-
quired if the grievances harboured by most of these groups are not to boil
over and precipitate a nation-wide conflict, and if a potentially massive ref-
ugee crisis is to be nrpped in the bud.
At the inter-African (international) level, it is imperative that the
African Union63 institute a Special Comtnission on National Minorities
(quite apart from its Conflict Resolution Mechanism)s to serye as the major
forum and centre for the coordination of African efforts to re-think and re-
orient the approaches of post-colonial African states such as Nigeria to the
fundamental state-building crises that face most of them-their crises of
legitimate statehood. It is recognized, of course, that simply turning to yet
another international institution is not going to wish away the deep struc-
tural problems that face post-colonial African states such as Nigeria. Yet, if
it is recogrized, as has been demonstrated elsewhere,65 that this structural
crisis is the central factor in the production of the grave instabitities that has
6r See, Supra note 46
62 See, Supra note 47.
63 This inter-African international institution was formerly known as the Organi-
zation of African Unity. See Constitutive Act of tlrc AfricanUnion (20m), availnble




.See Mutua supra note 53, at 522-523.
beset almost every post-colonial African state, then the imperative need for
this particulm kind of institution becomes palpable.
Refugee scholars need to embrace more fully and more obviously a
research agenda that focuses much more on pre+onfhct than on post-con-
flict peacebuilding. If we are to reduce significantly the human costs of
conflict, the structural legitimacy crises that afflicts most post-colonial Afri-
can statres, including Nigeria, need much more devoted and focused schol-
arly investigation, not just afier a war has broken out, but well ahead of the
occrurence of such catastrophes.
Each of these proposals has the potential to serve as resources or
conceptual frameworks in the effort to prevent some of the incidences of
violent conflicts in Nigeria, as elsewhere. In this sense, the proposals are
also relevant to the prevention of a large-scale refugee crisis in Nigeria.
Given the negative attitudes of many states to such large-scale refugee
flows, the occurrence of such a massive humanitarian crisis would likely
inhibit curent efforts to defend, preserve and even enhance the interna-
tional refugee protection system.6
V. CoNcr-usroNs
What I have attempted to achieve in this Article is the forging of
analytic linkages among three phenomena: the potentially explosive struc-
tural legitirnacy crisis that afflicts the Nigerian state; the mass refugee out-
flows that would be produced by such an explosion; and the potential of
such a mass refugee crisis to inhibit efforts to defend, prcserve, and even
enhance our embattled international refugee protection system. The aim of
the Article has not been to paint the picture of a doomsday scenario in
Nigeria. After all, Nigeria has survived one civil war and hundreds of lo-
calized conflicts, albeit at gre;zit cost to national hamrony and human devel-
opment.6? The point has simply been to urge that a more concerted effort
made to confront squarely the structural legitimacy crisis that remains at the
root of most social conflagrations in Nigeria and thus help avoid what
would be an unprecedented national catastnophe. Such a humanitarian ca-
6 G.S. Goodwin-Gill, Asylum: The Law and Politics of Clwnge,7 lvr'l J. Rnru-
cee L. l, 13-15 (lD5); S. Cnsr-ns & M. Mu-r-en, eds., Tne Aae or Mtcnenon:
IxrBnNnnoNeI- POpuIATIoN Move[,rBr.rTs IN T]IE MOoenN WOnr-n (S. CastleS &
M. Miller, eds., Macrnillan, 1998); J.C. Hathaway & R.A. Neve, Making Intema-
tional Refugee law Relevant Again: A Proposal For Collectivized and Solution-
Oriented Protection l0 Hnnv. Huu. Rrs. J. 115, 116 (1997); Seq Crm*nu, supra
note 2, at l+15.
67 A. Ikoku, Proclamation of thc Repubhc of Biafra,6 I.L'M. 665,670 (1967). See
a/so, Nixon, supra note 29, at 476.
